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This article explores the definition and interpretation of the traditional paradig-
matic sense relations such as hyponymy, synonymy, meronymy, antonymy, and
syntagmatic relations such as selectional restrictions. A descriptive and critical
overview of the relations is provided in section 1 and in section 2 the relation be-
tween sense relations and different theories of word meaning is briefly reviewed.
The discussion covers early to mid twentieth century structuralist approaches to
lexical meaning, with its concomitant view of the lexicon as being structured into
semantic fields, leading to more recent work on decompositional approaches to
word meaning. The latter are contrasted with atomic views of lexical meaning
and the capturing of semantic relations through the use of meaning postulates.
1. Introduction
Naive discussions of meaning in natural languages almost invariably centre around the
meanings of content words, rather than the meanings of grammatical words or phrases
and sentences, as is normal in academic approaches to the semantics of natural languages.
Indeed, at first sight, it might seem to be impossible to construct a theory of meaning of
sentences without first uncovering the complexity of meaning relations that hold between
the words of a language that make them up. So, it might be argued, to know the meaning
of the sentence Matthew rears horses we need also to at least know the meaning of Matthew
rears animals or Matthew breeds horses, since horses are a kind of animal and rearing tends
to imply breeding. It is in this context that the notion of sense relations, the meaning
relations between words (and expressions) of a language, could be seen as fundamental
to the success of the semantic enterprise. Indeed, the study of sense relations has a long
tradition in the western grammatical and philosophical traditions, going back at least to
Aristotle with discussions of relevant phenomena appearing throughout the medieval and
later literature. However, the systematisation and taxonomic classification of the system of
sense relations was only taken up in the structuralist movements of the twentieth century,
particularly in Europe following the swift developments in structuralist linguistics after
de Saussure. This movement towards systematic analyses of word sense was then taken
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up in the latter part of that century and the early part of the twenty-first century in
formal modelling of the sense relations and, in particular, the development of computational
models of these for the purposes of natural language processing.
The notion of ‘sense’ in this context may be variously interpreted, but is usually inter-
preted in contrast to the notion of reference (or, equivalently, denotation or extension). The
latter expresses the idea that one aspect of word meaning is the relation between words and
the things that they can be used properly to talk about. Thus, the reference/denotation
of cat is the set of all cats (that are, have been and will be); that of run (on one theoretical
approach), the set of all past, present and future events of running (or, on another view,
the set of all things that ever have, are or will engage in the activity we conventionally
refer to in English as running). Sense, on the other hand, abstracts away from the things
themselves to the property that allows us to pick them out. The sense of cat is thus the
property that allows us to identify on any occasion an object of which it can truthfully
be said that is a cat - ‘catness’ (however that might be construed, cognitively in terms of
some notion of concept, see for instance Jackendoff 2002 or model-theoretically in terms
of denotations at different indices, see Montague 1974). Sense relations are thus relations
between the properties that words express, rather than between the things they can be
used to talk about (although, as becomes clear very quickly, it is often very difficult to
separate the two notions).
Whether or not the study of sense relations can provide a solid basis for the development
of semantic theories (and there are good reasons for assuming they cannot), nevertheless
the elaboration and discussion of such meaning relations can shed light on the nature of the
problems we confront in providing such theories, not least in helping to illuminate features
of meaning that are truly amenable to semantic analysis and those that remain mysterious.
2. The basic sense relations
There are two basic types of sense relation. The most commonly presented in introductory
texts are the paradigmatic relations that hold between words of the same general cate-
gory or type and that are characterised in terms of contrast and hierarchy. Typically, a
paradigmatic relation holds between words (or word-forms) when there is choice between
them. So given the string John bought a, it is possible to substitute any noun that denotes
something that can be bought: suit, T-shirt, cauliflower, vegetable, house, . . . . Between
some of these words there is more to the choice between them than just the fact they are
nouns denoting commodities. So, for example, if John bought a suit is true then it follows
that John bought a pair of trousers is also true by virtue of the fact that pairs of trousers
are parts of suits and if John bought a cauliflower is true then John bought a vegetable is
also true, this time by virtue of the fact that cauliflowers are vegetables.
The second type of sense relations are syntagmatic which hold between words according
to their ability to co-occur meaningfully with each other in sentences. Typically syntag-
matic sense relations hold between words of different syntactic categories or (possibly)
semantic types such as verbs and nouns or adverbs and prepositional phrases. In general,
the closer the syntactic relation between two words such as between a head word and its se-
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mantic arguments or between a modifier and a head, the more likely it is that one word will
impose conditions on the semantic properties the other is required to show. For example,
in the discussion in the previous paragraph, the things that one can (non-metaphorically)
buy are limited to concrete objects that are typically acceptable commodities in the rele-
vant culture: in a culture without slavery adding boy to the string would be highly marked.
As we shall see below, there is a sense in which these two dimensions, of paradigm and
syntagm, cannot be kept entirely apart, but it is useful to begin the discussion as if they
do not share interdependencies.
Of the paradigmatic sense relations there are three basic ones that can be defined
between lexemes, involving sense inclusion, sense exclusion and identity of sense. Within
these three groups, a number of different types of relation can be identified and, in addition,
to these other sorts of sense relations, such as part-whole, have been identified and discussed
in the literature. As with most taxonomic endeavours, researchers may be ‘lumpers’,
preferring as few primary distinctions as possible, and ‘splitters’ who consider possibly
small differences in classificatory properties as sufficient to identify a different class. With
respect to sense relations, the problem of when In this article, I shall deal with only those
relations that are sufficiently robust as to have become standard within lexical semantics:
antonymy, hyponymy, synonymy and meronymy to define an additional distinction within
the taxonomy gives rise to questions about the relationship between knowledge of the
world and knowledge of a word: where does one end and the other begin (cf. 33. World
knowledge vs. word knowledge). In general, finer points of detail will be ignored in this
article and the discussion will be confined to the primary, and generally accepted, sense
relations, beginning with hyponymy.
2.1 Hyponymy
Hyponymy involves specific instantiations of a more general concept such as holds between
horse and animal or vermilion and red or buy and get. In each case, one word provides a
more specific type of concept than is displayed by the other. The more specific word is
called a hyponym and the more general word is the superordinate which are also referred to
as hyperonyms or hypernyms, although the latter is dispreferred as in non-rhotic dialects
of English it is homophonic with hyponym. Where the words being classified according to
this relation are nouns, one can test for hyponymy by replacing X and Y in the frame ‘X
is a kind of Y’ and seeing if the result makes sense. So we have ‘(A) horse is a kind of
animal’ but not ‘(An) animal is a kind of horse’ and so on. A very precise definition of
the relation is not entirely straightforward. One obvious approach is to have recourse to
class inclusion, so that the set of things denoted by a hyponym is a subset of the set of
things denoted by the superordinate. So the class of buying events is a subset of the class
of getting events. This works fine for words that describe concrete entities, but becomes
metaphysically more challenging when abstract words like thought emotion, belief etc. are
considered. More importantly there are words that may be said to have sense but no
denotation such as phoenix, hobbit, light sabre and so on. As such expressions do not pick
out anything in the real word they can be said to denote only the empty set and yet,
obviously, there are properties that such entities would possess if they existed that would
456
animal
mammal
horse
mare stallion foal filly
sheep
ewe lamb
cow
calf bull
bird
eagle blackbird
fish
shark pike
Figure 1: Hyponyms of animal
enable us to tell them apart. A better definition of hyponymy therefore is to forego the
obvious and intuitive reliance on class membership and define the relation in terms of sense
inclusion rather than class inclusion: the sense of the superordinate being included in the
sense of the hyponym. So a daffodil has the sense of flower included in it and more besides.
If we replace ‘sense’, as something we are trying to define, with the (perhaps) more neutral
term ‘property’, then we have:
(1) Hyponymy : X is a hyponym of Y if it is the case that if anything is such that it has
the property expressed by X then it also has the property expressed by Y
Notice that this characterisation in terms of a universally quantified implication statement,
does not require there to be actually be anything that has a particular property, merely
that if such a thing existed it would have that property.
Furthermore, in general if X and Y are hyponyms of Z (co-hyponyms, where two words
can be defined as co-hyponyms just in case they share the same superordinate term and
one is not a hyponym of the other, then they are generally incompatible (unless they are
synonymous). For example, horse, cat, bird, sheep, etc. are all co-hyponyms of mammal
and all mutually incompatible with each other: *That sheep is a horse. Hyponymy is
a transitive relation so that if X is a hyponym of Y and Y is a hyponym of Z then X
is a hyponym of Z: foal is a hyponym of horse, horse is a hyponym of animal, so foal
is a hyponym of animal. This sort of property indicates how hyponymy imposes partial
hierarchical structure on a vocabulary. Such hierarchies may define a taxonomy of (say)
natural kinds as in Figure 1. Complete hierarchies are not common, however. Often in
trying to define semantic fields of this sort, the researcher discovers that there may be
gaps in the system where some expected superordinate term is missing. For example,
in the lexical field defined by move we have hyponyms like swim, fly, roll and then a
whole group of verbs involving movement using legs such as run, walk, hop, jump, skip,
crawl, etc. There is, however, no word in English to express the concept that classifies the
latter group together. Such gaps abound in any attempt to construct a fully hierarchical
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lexicon based on hyponymy. Some of these gaps may be explicable through socio-cultural
norms (for example, gaps in kinship terms in all languages), but many are simply random:
languages do not require all hierarchical terms to be lexicalised. That is not to say, however,
that languages cannot express such apparently superordinate concepts. As above, we can
provide the concept required as superordinate by modifying its apparent superordinate to
give move using legs. Indeed, Lyons (1977) argues that hyponymy can in general be defined
in terms of predicate modification of a superordinate. Thus, swim is move through fluid,
mare is female horse, lamb is immature sheep and so on. This move pushes a paradigmatic
relation onto some prior syntagmatic basis:
Hyponymy is a paradigmatic relation of sense which rests upon the encap-
sulation in the hyponym of some syntagmatic modification of the sense of the
superordinate relation. Lyons (1977:294)
Such a definition does not work completely. For example, it makes no sense at the level
of natural kinds (is horse to be defined as equine animal?) and there are other apparent
syntagmatic definitions that are problematic in that precise definitions are not obvious
(saunter is exactly what kind of walk?). Such considerations, of course, reflect the vagueness
of the concepts that words express out of context and so we might expect any such absolute
definition of hyponymy to fail.
Hyponymy strictly speaking is definable only between words of the same (syntactic) cat-
egory, but some groups of apparent co-hyponyms seem to be related to a word of some other
category. This seems particularly true of predicate-denoting expressions like adjectives
which often seem to relate to (abstract) nouns as superordinates rather than some other
adjective. For example, round, square, tetrahedral, etc. all seem to be ‘quasi-hyponyms’ of
the noun shape and hot, warm, cool, cold relate to temperature.
Finally, the hierarchies induced by hyponymy may be cross-cutting. So the animal
field also relates to fields involving maturity (adult, young) or sex (male, female) and per-
haps other domains. This entails that certain words may be hyponyms of more than one
superordinate, depending on different dimensions of relatedness. As we shall see below,
such multiple dependencies have given rise to a number of theoretical approaches to word
meaning that try to account directly for sense relations in terms of primitive sense compo-
nents or inheritance of properties in some hierarchical arrangement of conceptual or other
properties.
2.2 Synonymy
Synonymy between two words involves sameness of sense and two words may be defined
as synonyms if they are mutually hyponymous. For example, sofa and settee are both
hyponyms of furniture and both mutually entailing since if Bill is sitting on a settee is true,
then it is true that Bill is sitting on a sofa, and vice versa. This way of viewing synonymy
defines it as occurring between two words just in case they are mutually intersubstitutable
in any sentence without changing the meaning (or truth conditions) of those sentences.
So violin and fiddle both denote the same sort of musical instrument so that Joan plays
the violin and Joan plays the fiddle both have the same truth conditions (are both true or
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false in all the same circumstances). Synonyms are beloved of lexicographers and thesauri
contain lists of putative synonyms. However, true or absolute synonyms are very rarely
attested and there is a significant influence of context on the acceptability of apparent
synonyms. Take an example from Roget’s thesaurus taken at random, 726, for combatant
in which some of the synonyms presented are:
(2) disputant, controversialist, litigant, belligerent; competitor, rival; fighter, assailant,
agressor, champion; swashbuckler, duellist, bully, fighting-man, boxer, gladiator, ...
Even putting to one side the dated expressions, it would be difficult to construct a single
context in which all these words could be substituted for each other without altering the
meaning or giving rise to pragmatic awkwardness. Context is the key for acceptability of
synonym construal. Even the clear synonymy of fiddle = violin mentioned above shows
differences in acceptability in different contexts: if Joan typically plays violin in a symphony
orchestra or as soloist in classical concerti, then someone might object that she does not
play the fiddle, where that term may be taken to imply the playing of more popular styles
of music. Even the sofa = settee example might be argued to show some differences, for
example in terms of the register of the word or possibly in terms of possible differences
in the objects the words pick out. It would appear, in fact, that humans typically don’t
entertain full synonymy and when presented with particular synonyms in context will try
and provide explanations of (possibly imaginary) differences. Such an effect would be
explicable in terms of some pragmatic theory such as Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson
1986/1995) in which the use of different expressions in the same contexts is expected to
give rise to different inferential effects.
A more general approach to synonymy allows there to be degrees of synonymy where this
may be considered to involve degrees of semantic overlap and it is this sort of synonymy that
is typically assumed by lexicographers in the construction of dictionaries. Kill and murder
are strongly but not absolutely synonymous, differing perhaps in terms of intentionality of
the killer/murderer and also the sorts of objects such expressions may take (one may kill a
cockroach but does not thereby murder it). Of course, there are conditions on the degree
of semantic similarity that we consider to be definitional of synonymy. In the first place,
it should in general be the case that the denial of one synonym implicitly denies the other.
Mary is not truthful seems correctly to implicitly deny the truth of Mary is honest and
Joan didn’t hit the dog implies that she didn’t beat it. Such implications may only go one
way and that is often the case with near synonyms. The second condition on the amount of
semantic overlap that induces near synonymy is that the terms should not be contrastive.
Thus, labrador and corgi have a large amount of semantic overlap in that they express
breeds of dog, but there is an inherent contrast between these terms and so they cannot
in general be intersubstitutable in any context and maintain the truth of the sentence.
Near-synonyms are often used to explain a word already used: John was dismissed, sacked
in fact. But if the terms contrast in meaning in some way then the resulting expression is
usually nonsensical: #John bought a corgi, a labrador, in fact, where # indicates pragmatic
markedness.
The felicity of the use of particular words is strongly dependent on context. The reasons
for this have to do with the ways in which synonyms may differ. At the very least two
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synonymous terms may differ in style or register. So, for example, baby and neonate both
refer to newborn humans, but while the neonate was born three weeks premature means the
same as the baby was born three weeks premature, What a beautiful neonate! is distinctly
peculiar. Some synonyms differ in terms of stylistic markedness. Conceal and hide, for
example, are not always felicitously intersubstitutable. John hid the silver in the garden
and John concealed the silver in the garden seem strongly synonymous, but John concealed
Mary’s gloves in the cupboard does not have the same air of normality about it as John hid
Mary’s gloves in the cupboard. Other aspects of stylistic variation involve expressiveness
or slang. So while gob and mouth mean the same, the former is appropriately used in very
informal contexts only or for its shock value. Swear words in general often have acceptable
counterparts and euphemism and dysphemism thus provides a fertile ground for synonyms:
lavatory = bathroom = toilet = bog = crapper, etc.; fuck = screw = sleep with, and so on.
Less obvious differences in expressiveness come about through the use of synonyms that
indicate familiarity with the object being referred to such as the variants of kinship terms:
mother = mum = mummy = ma. Regional and dialectal variations of a language may also
give rise to synonyms that may or may not co-occur in the language at large: valley =
dale = glen or autumn = fall. Sociolinguistic variation thus plays a very large part in the
existence of near synonymy in a language.
2.3 Antonymy
The third primary paradigmatic sense relation involves oppositeness in meaning, often
called antonymy (although Lyons 1977 restricts the use of this term to gradable opposites)
and is defined informally in terms of contrast, such that if ‘A is X’ then ‘A is not Y’. So,
standardly, if John is tall is true then John is not small is also true. Unlike hyponymy,
there are a number of ways in which the senses of words contrast. The basic distinction
is typically made between gradable and ungradable opposites. Typically expressed by
adjectives in English and other Western European languages, gradable antonyms form
instances of contraries and implicitly or explicitly invoke a field over which the grading
takes place, i.e. a standard of comparison. Assuming, for example, that John is human,
then human size provides the scale against which John is tall is measured. In this way,
John’s being tall for a human does not mean that he is tall when compared to buildings.
Note that the implicit scale has to be the same scale invoked for any antonym: John is tall
contrasts with John is not small for a human, not John is not small for a building. Other
examples of gradable antonyms are easy to identify: cold/hot, good/bad, old/young and so
on.
(3) Gradable antonymy : Gradable antonyms form instances of contraries and implicitly
or explicitly invoke a field over which the grading takes place, i.e. a standard of
comparison.
Non-gradable antonyms are, as the name suggests, absolutes and divide up the domain
of discourse into discrete classes. Hence, not only does the positive of one antonym im-
ply the negation of the other, but the negation of one implies the positive of the other.
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Such non-gradable antonyms are also called complementaries and include pairs such as
male/female, man/woman, dead/alive.
(4) Complementaries (or binary antonyms) are all non-gradable and the sense of one
entails the negation of the other and the negation of one sense entails the positive
sense of the other.
Notice that there is, in fact, a syntagmatic restriction that is crucial to this definition. It
has to be the case that the property expressed by some word is meaningfully predicable
of the object to which it is applied. So, while that person is male implies that that person
is not female and that person is not female implies that that person is male, that rock
is not female does not imply that that rock is male. Rocks are things that do not have
sexual distinctions. Notice further that binary antonyms are quite easily coerced into being
gradable, in which case the complementarity of the concepts disappears. So we can say of
someone that they are not very alive without committing ourselves to the belief that they
are very dead.
Amongst complementaries, some pairs of antonyms may be classed as privative in that
one member expresses a positive property that the other negates. These include pairs
such as animate/inanimate. Others are termed equipollent when both properties express
a positive concept such as male/female. Such a distinction is not always easy to make: is
the relation dead/alive equipollent or privative?
Some relational antonyms differ in the perspective from which a relation is viewed:
in other words, according to the order of their arguments. Pairs such as husband/wife,
parent/child are of this sort and are called converses.
(5) Converses: involve relational terms where the argument positions involved with one
lexeme are reversed with another and vice versa.
So if Mary is John’s wife then John is Mary’s husband. In general, the normal antonymic
relation stands, provided that the relation expressed is strictly asymmetric: Mary is Hi-
lary’s child implies Mary is not Hilary’s parent. Converses may involve triadic predicates
as well, such as buy/sell, although it is only the agent and the goal that are reversed in
such cases. If Mary buys a horse from Bill then it must be the case that Bill sells a horse
to Mary. Note that the relations between the two converses here are not parallel: the agent
subject of buy is related to the goal object of sell whereas the agent subject of sell is related
to the source object of buy. This may indicate that the converse relation, in this case at
least, resides in the actual situations described by sentences containing these verbs rather
than necessarily inherently being part of the meanings of the verbs themselves.
So far, we have seen antonyms that are involved in binary contrasts such as die/live,
good/bad and so on, and the relation of antonymy is typically said only to refer to such
binary contrasts. But contrast of sense is not per se restricted to binary contrasts. For
example, co-hyponyms all have the basic oppositeness property of exclusion. So, if some-
thing is a cow, it is not a sheep, dog, lion or any other type of animal and equally for all
other co-hyponyms that are not synonyms. It is this exclusion of sense that makes corgi
and labrador non-synonymous despite the large semantic overlap in their semantic prop-
erties (as breeds of dogs). Lyons (1977) calls such a non-binary relation ‘incompatibility’.
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Some contrastive gradable antonyms form scales where there is an increase (decrease) of
some characteristic property from one extreme of the scale to another. With respect to the
property heat or temperature we have the scale {freezing, cold, cool, lukewarm, warm, hot,
boiling}. These adjectives may be considered to be quasi-hyponyms of the noun heat and all
partake of the oppositeness relation. Interestingly (at least for this scale), related points
on the scale act like (gradable) antonyms: freezing/boiling, cold/hot, cool/warm. There
are other types of incompatible relations such as ranks (e.g. {private (soldier), coporal,
sergeant, staff sergeant, warrant officer, lieutenant, major, . . . }) and cycles (e.g. {monday,
tuesday, wednesday, thursday, friday, saturday, sunday}).
Finally on this topic, it is necessary again to point out the context-sensitivity of
antonymy. Although within the colour domain red has no obvious antonym, in partic-
ular contexts it does. So with respect to wine, the antonym of red is white and in the
context of traffic signals, its opposite is green. Without a context, the obvious antonym
to dry is wet, but again within the context of wine, its antonym is sweet, in the context
of skin it is soft and for food moist (examples taken from Murphy 2003). This contextual
dependence is problematic for the definition of antonymy just over words (rather than con-
cepts), unless it is assumed that the lexicon is massively homonymous (see below). (See
also 22. Dual oppositions in lexical meaning.)
2.4 Part-whole relations
The final widely recognised paradigmatic sense relation is that involving ‘part-of’ relations
or meronymies.
(6) Meronymy : If ‘X is part-of Y or ‘Y has X then X is a meronym of Y and Y is a
holonym of X.
Thus, toe is a meronym of foot and foot is a meronym of leg, which in turn is a meronym
of body. Notice that there is some similarities between meronymy and hyponymy in that
a (normal) hand includes fingers and finger somehow includes the idea of hand, but, of
course, they are not the same things and so do not always take part in the same entailment
relations as hyponyms and superordinates. So while Mary hurt her finger (sort of) entails
Mary hurt her hand, just asMary hurt her lamb entails Mary hurt an animal, Mary saw her
finger does not entail Mary saw her hand, unlike Mary saw her lamb does entail Mary saw
an animal. Hence, although meronymy is like hyponymy in that the part-whole relations
define hierarchical distinctions in the vocabulary, it is crucially different in that meronyms
and holonyms define different types of object that may not share any semantic properties
at all: a finger is not a kind of hand, but it does share properties with hands such as being
covered in skin and being made of flesh and bone; but a wheel shares very little with one
of its holonyms car, beyond being a manufactured object. Indeed, appropriate entailment
relations between sentences containing meronyms and their corresponding holonyms are
not easily stated and, while the definition given above is a reasonable approximation, it is
not unproblematic. Cruse (1986) attempts to restrict the meronymy relation just to those
connections between words that allow both the ‘X is part of Y’ and ‘Y has X’ paraphrases.
He points out that the ‘has a’ relation does not always involve a ‘part of’ one, at least
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between the two words: a wife has a husband but not #a husband is part of a wife. On
the other hand, the reverse may also not hold: stress is part of the job does not mean that
the job has stress, at least not in the sense of possession.
However, even if one accepts that both paraphrases must hold of a meronymic pair,
there remain certain problems. As an example, the pair of sentences a husband is part of a
marriage and a marriage has a husband seems to be reasonably acceptable, it is not obvious
that marriage is strictly a holonym of husband. It may be, therefore, that it is necessary
to restrict the relation to words that denote things of the same general type: concrete or
abstract which will induce different ‘part of’ relations depending on the way some word is
construed. So, a chapter is part of a book = Books have chapters if book is taken to be the
abstract construal of structure, but not if it is taken to be the concrete object. Furthermore,
it might be necessary to invoke notions like ‘discreteness’ in order to constrain the relation.
For example, flesh is part of a hand and hands have flesh, but are these words thereby in
a meronymic relationship? Flesh is a substance and so not individuated and if meronymy
requires parts and wholes to be discretely identifiable, then the relationship would not
hold of these terms.Again we come to the problem of world-knowledge, which tells us that
fingers are prototypically parts of hands, versus word-knowledge: is it the case that the
meaning of ‘finger’ necessarily contains the information that it forms part of a hand and
thus that some aspect of the meaning of ‘hand’ is contained in the meaning of ‘finger’? If
that were the case, how do we account for the lack of any such inference in extensions of
the word to cover (e.g.) emerging shoots of plants (cf. finger of asparagus)? cf. 33. World
knowledge vs. word knowledge.
This short paragraph does not do justice to the extensive discussions of meronymy, but
it should be clear that it is by far the most problematic of the paradigmatic relations to
pin down, a situation that has led some scholars to reject its existence as a different type
of sense relation altogether. (See further Croft and Cruse 2004, 159-163, Murphy 2003,
216-235)
2.5 Syntagmatic relations
Syntagmatic relations between words appear to be less amenable to the sort of taxonomies
associated with paradigmatic relations. However, there is no doubt that some words ‘go
naturally’ with each other, beyond what may be determined by general syntactic rules of
combination. At one extreme, there are fixed idioms where the words must combine to
yield a specific meaning. Hence we have idiomatic expressions in English meaning ‘die’
such as kick the bucket (a reference to death by hanging) or pass away or pass over (to the
other side) (references to religious beliefs) and so on. There are certain words also that only
have a very limited ability to appear with others such as is the case with addled which can
only apply to eggs or brains. Other collocational possibilities may be much freer, although
none are constrained solely by syntactic category. For example, hit is a typical transitive
verb in English that takes a noun phrase as object. However, it further constrains which
noun phrases it acceptably collocates with by requiring the thing denoted by that noun
phrase to have concrete substance. Beyond that, collocational properties are fairly free (cf.
20. Idioms and collocations):
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(7) The plane hit water/a building/#the idea.
That words do have semantic collocational properties can be seen by examining strings
of words that are ‘grammatical’ (however defined) but make no sense. An extreme exam-
ple of this is Chomsky (1965)’s ubiquitous colorless green ideas sleep furiously in which
the syntactic combination of the words is licit (as an example of a subject noun phrase
containing modifiers and a verb phrase containing an intransitive verb and an adverb) but
no information is expressed because of the semantic anomalies that result from this par-
ticular combination. There are various sources of anomaly. In the first place, there may
be problems resulting from what Cruse (2000) calls collocational preferences. Where such
preferences are violated, various degrees of anomaly can arise, ranging from marginally odd
through to the incomprehensible. For example, the sentence my pansies have passed away
is peculiar because pass away is typically predicated of a human (or pet) not flowers. How-
ever, the synonymous sentence, my pansies have died, involves no such peculiarity since
the verb die is predicable of anything which is capable of life such as plants and animals. A
worse clash of meaning thus derives from the collocation of an inanimate subject and any
verb or idiom meaning ‘die’. My bed has died is thus worse than my pansies have passed
away, although notice that metaphorical interpretations can be (and often are) attributed
to such strings. For example, one could interpret my bed has died as indicating that the
bed has collapsed or is otherwise broken and such metaphorical extensions are common.
Compare the use of die collocated with words such as computer, car, phone, etc. Notice
further in this context that the antonym of die is not live but go or run. It is only when
too many clashes occur that metaphorical interpretation breaks down and no information
at all can be derived from a string of words. Consider again colorless green ideas sleep
furiously. Parts of this sentence are less anomalous than the whole and we can assign (by
whatever means) some interpretation to them:
(8) a. Green ideas: ‘environmentally friendly ideas’ or ‘young, untried ideas’ (both
via the characteristic property of young plant shoots);
b. Colorless ideas: ‘uninteresting ideas’ (via lacklustre, dull);
c. Colorless green ideas: ‘uninteresting ideas about the environment’ or
‘uninteresting untried ideas’ (via associated negative connotations of things
without colour);
d. Ideas sleep: ‘ideas are not currently active’ (via inactivity associated with
sleeping);
e. Green parrots sleep furiously: ‘parrots determinedly asleep (?)” or ‘parrots
restlessly asleep’.
But in putting all the words together, the effort involved in resolving all the contradictions
just gets beyond any possible effect on the context by the information content of the final
proposition. The more contradictions that need to be resolved in processing some sentence
the greater the amount of computation required to infer a non-contradictory proposition
from it and the less information the inferred proposition will convey. A sentence may be
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said to be truly anomalous if there is no relevant proposition that can be deduced from it
by pragmatic means.
A second type of clash involving collocational preferences is induced when words are
combined into phrases but add no new information to the string. Cruse calls this pleonasm
and exemplifies it with examples such as John kicked the ball with his foot (Cruse 2000:223).
Since kicking involves contact with something by a foot the string final prepositional phrase
adds nothing new and the sentence is odd (even though context may allow the apparent
tautology to be acceptable). Similar oddities arise with collocations such as female mother
or human author. Note that pleonasm does not always give rise to feelings of oddity. For
example, pregnant female does not seems as peculiar as #female mother, even although the
concept of ‘female’ is included in ‘pregnant’. This observation is indicative of the fact that
certain elements in strings of words have a privileged status. For example, it appears that
pleonastic anomaly is worse in situations in which a semantic head, a noun or verb that
determines the semantic properties of its satellites which does not always coincide with
what may be identified as the syntactic head of a construction, appears with a modifier
(or sometimes complement, but not always) whose meaning is contained within that of
the head: bovine mammal is better than #mammalian cow (what other sort of cow could
there be?). Pleonastic anomaly can usually be obviated by substituting a hyponym for one
expression or a superordinate of the other since this will give rise to informativity with
respect to the combination of words: female parent, He struck the ball with his foot and so
on.
Collocational preferences are often discussed with respect to the constraints imposed by
verbs or nouns on their arguments and sometimes these constraints have been incorporated
into syntactic theories. In Chomsky (1965), for example, the subcategorisation of verbs
was defined not just in terms of the syntactic categories of their argument but also their
semantic selectional properties. A verb like kick imposes a restriction on its direct object
that it is concrete (in non-metaphorical uses) and on its subject that it is something with
legs like an animal, whereas verbs like think require abstract objects and human subjects.
Subsequent research into the semantic properties of arguments led to the postulation of
participant (or case or thematic) roles which verbs ‘assign’ to their arguments with the
effect that certain roles constrained the semantic preferences of the verb to certain sorts
of subjects and objects. A verb like fear, therefore, assigns to its subject the role of
experiencer, thus limiting acceptable collocations to things that are able to fear such as
humans and other animals. Some roles such as experiencer, agent, recipient, etc. are more
tightly constrained by certain semantic properties, such as animacy, volition, and mobility
than others such as theme, patient (Dowty 1991).
We have seen that paradigmatic relations cannot always be separated from concepts
of syntagmatic relatedness. So Lyons’ attempts to define hyponymy in terms of the mod-
ification of a superordinate while the basic relation of antonymy holds only if the word
being modified denotes something that can be appropriately predicated of the relevant
properties. Given that meanings are constructed in natural languages by putting words
together, it would be unsurprising if syntagmatic relations are, in some sense, primary and
that paradigmatic relations are principally determined by collocational properties between
words. Indeed the primacy of syntagmatic relations is supported by psycholinguistic and
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acquisition studies. It is reported in Murphy (2003) that in word association experiments,
children under 7 tend to provide responses that reflect collocational patterns rather than
paradigmatic ones. So to a word like black the response of young children is more likely to
give rise to responses such as bird or board rather than the antonym white. Older children
and adults, on the other hand, tend to give paradigmatic responses. There is, furthermore,
some evidence that knowledge of paradigmatic relations is associated with metalinguistic
awareness: that is, awareness of the properties of, and interactions between, those words.
The primacy of syntagmatic relations over paradigmatic relations seems further to be borne
out by corpus and computational studies of collocation and lexis. For example, there are
many approaches to the automatic disambiguation of homonyms, identical word forms that
have different meanings (see below), that rely on syntagmatic context to determine which
sense is the most likely on a particular occasion of the use of some word. Such studies also
rely on corpus work from which collocational probabilities between expressions are calcu-
lated. In this regard, it is interesting to consider experimental research in computational
linguistics which attempts to induce automatic recognition of synonyms and hyponyms
in texts. Erk (2009) reports research which uses vector spaces to define representations
of words meanings where such spaces are defined in terms of collocations between words
in corpora. Without going into any detail here, she reports that (near) synonyms can
be identified in this manner to a high degree of accuracy, but that hyponymic relations
cannot be identified easily without such information being encoded, but that the use of
vector spaces allows such encoding to be done and to yield good results. Although this is
not her point, Erk’s results are interesting with respect to the possible relation between
syntagmatic and paradigmatic sense relations. Synonymy may be defined not just seman-
tically as involving sameness of sense, but syntactically as allowing substitution in the all
the same linguistic contexts (an idealisation, of course, given the rarity of full synonymy,
but probabilistic techniques may be used to get a definition of degree of similarity between
the contexts in which two words can appear). Hence, we might expect that defining vector
spaces in terms of collocational possibilities in texts will yield a high degree of compa-
rability between synonyms. But hyponymy cannot be defined easily in syntactic terms,
as hyponyms and their superordinates will not necessarily collocate in the same way (for
example, four-legged animal is more likely than four-legged dog while Collie dog is fine but
# Collie animal is marginal at best). Thus, just taking collocation into account, even in
a sophisticated manner, will fail to identify words in hyponymous relations. This implies
that paradigmatic sense relations are ‘higher order’ or ‘metalexical’ relations that do not
emerge directly from syntagmatic ones.
I leave this matter to one side from now on, because, despite the strong possibility
that syntagmatic relations are cognitively primary, it remains the case that the study of
paradigmatic relations remains the focus of studies of lexical semantics.
2.6 Homonymy and Polysemy
Although not sense relations of the same sort as those reviewed above in that they do not
structure the lexicon in systematic ways, homonymy and polysemy have nevertheless an
important place in considerations of word meaning and have played an important part in
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the development of theories of lexical semantics since the last two decades of the twentieth
century. Homonymy involves formal identity between words with distinct meanings (i.e. in-
terpretations with distinct extensions and senses) which Weinreich (1963) calls “contrastive
ambiguity”. Such formal identity may involve the way a word is spoken (homophony ‘same
sound’) such as bank, line, taxi, can, lead (noun) led (verb) and/or orthography bank,
line, putting, in which case it is referred to as homography ‘same writing’. It is often the
case that the term homonymy is reserved only for those words that are both homophones
and homographs, but equally often the term is used for either relation. Homonymy may be
full or partial: in the former case, every form of the lexeme is identical for both senses such
as holds for the noun punch (the drink or the action) or it may be partial in which only
some forms of the lexeme are identical for both senses, such as between the verb punch and
its corresponding noun. Homonymy leads to the sort of ambiguity that is easily resolved
in discourse context, whether locally through syntactic disambiguation (9a), the context
provided within a sentence (9b) or from the topic of conversation (9c).
(9) a. His illness isn’t terminal.
b. My terminal keeps cutting out on me.
c. I’ve just been through Heathrow. The new terminal is rubbish.
In general, there is very little to say about homonymy. It is random and generally only
tolerated when the meanings of the homonyms are sufficiently semantically differentiated
as to be easily disambiguated.
Of more interest is polysemy in which a word has a range of meanings in different
local contexts but in which the meaning differences are taken to be related in some way.
While homonymy may be said to involve true ambiguity, polysemy involves some notion of
vagueness or underspecification with respect to the meanings a polyseme has in different
contexts (cf. 23. Ambiguity and vagueness). The classic example of a polysemous word is
mouth which can denote the mouth of a human or animal or various other types of opening,
such as bottle, and more remotely of river. Unlike homonymy no notion of contrast in sense
is involved and polysemes are considered to have an apparently unique basic meaning that
is modified in context. The word bank is both a homonym and a polyseme in its meaning
of ‘financial establishment’ between its interpretation as the institution (The bank raised
its interest rates yesterday ) and its physical manifestation (The bank is next to the school).
One of the things that differentiates polysemy from homonymy is that the different senses
of polysemes are not ‘suppressed’ in context (as with homonyms) but one aspect of sense is
foregrounded or highlighted. Other senses are available in the discourse and can be picked
up by other words in the discourse:
(10) a. Mary tried to jump through the window (aperture), but it was closed
(aperture/physical object) and she broke it (physical object).
b. *Mary walked along the bank of the river. It had just put up interest rates yet
again.
Polysemy may involve a number of different properties: change of syntactic category
(11); variation in valency (12); and subcategorisation properties (13).
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(11) a. Rambo picked up the hammer (noun).
b. Rambo hammered (verb) the nail into the cat.
(12) a. The candle melted.
b. The heat melted the candle.
(13) a. Rambo forgot that he had buried the cat (clausal complement - factive
interpretation)
b. Rambo forgot to bury the cat (infinitival complement - non-factive
interpretation)
Some polysemy may be hidden and extensive, as often with gradable adjectives where
the adjective often picks out some typical property associated with the head noun that it
modifies which may vary considerably from noun to noun, as with the adjective good in
(16), where the interpretation varies considerably according to the semantics of the head
noun and contrasting strongly with other adjectives like big, as illustrated in (15). Note
that one might characterise the meaning of this adjective in terms of an underspecified
semantics such as that given in (16f).
(14)
(15) big car/big computer/big nose: ‘big for N
(16) a. good meal: ‘tasty, enjoyable, pleasant’
b. good knife: ‘sharp, easy to handle’
c. good car: ‘reliable, comfortable, fast’
d. good typist: ‘accurate, quick, reliable’
e. good N: ‘positive evaluation of some property associated with N
There are also many common alternations in polysemy that one may refer to as con-
structional (or logical) polysemy since they are regular and result from the semantic prop-
erties of what is denoted.
(17) a. Figure/Ground: window, door, room
b. Count/Mass: lamb, beer
c. Container/Contained: bottle, glass
d. Product/Producer: book, Kleenex
e. Plant/Food: apple, spinach
f. Process/Result: examination, merger
Such alternations depend to a large degree on the perspective that is taken with respect
to the objects denoted. So a window may be viewed in terms of an aperture (e.g. when it
is open) or in terms of what it is made of (glass, plastic in some sort of frame) while other
nouns can be viewed in terms of their physical or functional characteristics, and so on.
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Polysemy is not exceptional but rather the norm for word interpretation in context.
Arguably every content word is polysemous and may have its meaning extended in con-
text, systematically or unsystematically. The sense extensions of mouth, for example, are
clear examples of unsystematic metaphorical uses of the word, unsystematic because the
metaphor cannot be extended to just any sort of opening: ?# mouth of a flask, #mouth of
a motorway, ?# mouth of a stream, # mouth of a pothole. Of course, any of these colloca-
tions could become accepted, but it tends to be the case that until a particular collocation
has become commonplace, the phrase will be interpreted as involving real metaphor rather
than the use of a polysemous word. Unsystematic polysemy, therefore, may have a di-
achronic dimension with true (but not extreme) metaphorical uses becoming interpreted
as polysemy once established within a language. It is also possible for diachronically
homonymous terms to be interpreted as polysemes at some later stage. This has happened
with the word ear where the two senses (of a head and of corn) derive from different words
in Old English (e¯are and e¯ar , respectively).
More systematic types of metaphorical extension have been noted above, but may also
result from metonymy : the use of a word in a non-literal way, often based on a partwhole
or ‘connected to’ relationships. This may happen with respect to names of composers or
authors where the use of the name may refer to the person or to what they have produced.
(18) may be interpreted as Mary liking the man or the music (and indeed listening to or
playing the latter).
(18) Hans likes Beethoven.
Ad hoc types of metonymy may simply extend the concept of some word to some aspect
of a situation that is loosely related to, but contextually determined by, what the word
actually means. John has new wheels may be variously interpreted as John having a new
car or, if he was known to be paraplegic, as him having a new wheelchair. A more extreme,
but classic, example is one like (19) in which the actual meaning of the food lasagna is
extended to the person who ordered it. (Such examples are also known as ‘ham sandwich’
cases after the examples found in Nunberg 1995).
(19) The lasagna is getting impatient.
Obviously context is paramount here. In a classroom or on a farm, the example would be
unlikely to make any sense, whereas in a restaurant where the situation necessarily involves
a relation between customers and food, a metonymic relation can be easily constructed.
Some metonymic creations may become established within a linguistic community and thus
become less context-dependent. For example, the word suit(s) may refer not only to the
garment of clothing but also to people who wear them and thus the word gets associated
with types of people who do jobs that involve the wearing of suits, such as business people.
3. Sense relations and word meaning
As indicated in the discussion above, the benefit of studying sense relations appears to be
that it gives us an insight into word meaning generally. For this reason, such relations have
often provided the basis for different theories of lexical semantics.
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3.1 Lexical fields and Componential Analysis
One of the earliest modern attempts to provide a theory of word meaning using sense rela-
tions is associated with European structuralists, developing out of the work of de Saussure
in the first part of the twentieth century. Often associated with theories of componential
analysis (see below), lexical field theory gave rise to a number of vying approaches to lexical
meaning, but which all share the hypothesis that the meanings (or senses) of words de-
rive from their relations to other words within some thematic/conceptual domain defining
a semantic or lexical field. In particular, it is assumed that hierarchical and contrastive
relations between words sharing a conceptual domain is sufficient to define the meaning of
those words. Early theorists such as Trier (1934) or Porzig (1934) were especially interested
in the way such fields develop over time with words shifting with respect to the part of a
conceptual field that they cover as other words come into or leave that space. For Trier,
the essential properties of a lexical field are that:
(i) the meaning of an individual word is dependent upon the meaning of all the other the
words in the same conceptual domain;
(ii) a lexical field has no gaps so that the field covers some connected conceptual space (or
reflects some coherent aspect of the world);
(iii) if a word undergoes a change in meaning, then the whole structure of the lexical field
also changes.
One of the obvious weaknesses of such an approach is that the identification of a conceptual
domain cannot be identified independently of the meaning of the expressions themselves
and so appears somewhat circular. Indeed, such research presented little more than de-
scriptions of diachronic semantic changes as there was little or no predictive power in
determining what changes are and are not possible within lexical fields, nor what lexical
gaps are tolerated and what not. Indeed, it seems reasonable to suppose that no such
theory could exist, given the randomness that the lexical development of contentive words
displays and so there is no reason to suppose that sense relations play any part in determin-
ing such change. (See Ullman 1957, Geckeler 1971, Coseriu & Geckeler 1981, for detailed
discussions of field theories at different periods of the twentieth century.)
Although it is clear that ‘systems of interrelated senses’ (Lyons 1977:252) exist within
languages, it is not clear that they can usefully form the basis for explicating word meaning.
The most serious criticism of lexical field theory as more than a descriptive tool is that it
has unfortunate implications for how humans could ever know the meaning of a word: if
a word’s meaning is determined by its relation to other words in its lexical field, then to
know that meaning someone has to know all the words associated with that lexical field.
For example, to know the meaning of tulip, it would not be enough to know that it is a
hyponym of (plant) bulb and a co-hyponym of daffodil, crocus, anemone, lily, dahlia but
also to trillium, erythronium, bulbinella, disia, brunsvigia and so on. But only a botanist
specialising in bulbous plants is likely to know anything like the complete list of names,
and even then this is unlikely. Of course, someone can be said to know the meaning of
tulip independently of whether they have any knowledge of any other bulb or even flowering
plant. Of course, one might say that individuals might have a shallower or deeper knowledge
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of some lexical field, but the problem persists, if one is trying to characterise the nature
of word meaning within a language rather than within individuals. And it means that the
structure of a lexical field and thus the meaning of a word will necessarily change with any
and every apparent change in knowledge. But it is far from clear that the meaning of tulip
would be affected if, for example, botanists decided that that a disia is not bulbous but
rhizomatous, and thus does not after all form part of the particular lexical field of plants
that have bulbs as storage organs.
Field theory came to be associated in the nineteen-sixties with another theory of word
meaning in which sense relations played a central part. This is the theory of componential
analysis which was adapted by Katz & Fodor (1963) for linguistic meaning from similar
approaches in anthropology. In this theory, the meaning of a word is decomposed into
semantic components, often conceived as features of some sort. Such features are taken
to be cognitively real semantic primitives which combine to define the meanings of words
in a way that automatically predicts their paradigmatic sense relations with other words.
For example, one might decompose the two meanings of dog as consisting of the primitive
features [CANINE] and [CANINE,MALE,ADULT]. Since the latter contains the semantic
structure of the former, it is directly determined to be a hyponym. Assuming that bitch has
the componential analysis [CANINE,FEMALE,ADULT], the hyponym meaning of dog is
easily identified as an antonym of bitch as they differ one just one semantic feature. So the
theory provides a direct way of accounting for sense relations: synonymy involves identity
of features; hyponymy involves extension of features; and antonymy involves difference in
one feature. Although actively pursued in the nineteen sixties and seventies, the approach
fell out of favour in mainstream linguistics for a number of reasons. From an ideological
perspective, the theory became associated with the Generative Semantics movement which
attempted to derive surface syntax from deep semantic meaning components. When this
movement was discredited, the logically distinct semantic theory of componential analysis
was mainly rejected too. More significantly, however, the theory came in for heavy criticism.
In the first place, there is the problem of how primitives are to be identified, particularly
if the assumption is that the set of primitives is universal. Although more recent work has
attempted to give this aspect of decompositional theories as a whole a more empirically
motivated foundation (Wierzbicka 1996), nevertheless there appears to be some randomness
to the choice of primitives and the way they are said to operate within particular languages.
Additionally, the theory has problems with things like natural kinds: what distinguishes
[CANINE] from the meaning of dog or [EQUINE] from horse? And does each animal (or
plant) species have to be distinguished in this way? If so, then the theory achieves very
little beyond adding information about sex and age to the basic concepts described by dog
and horse. Using Latinate terms to indicate sense components for natural kinds simply
obscures the fact that the central meanings of these expressions are not decomposable.
An associated problem is that features were often treated as binary so that, for example,
puppy might be analysed as [CANINE,-ADULT]. Likewise, instead of MALE/FEMALE
one might have ±MALE or [-ALIVE] for dead. The problem here is obvious: how does
one choose a non-arbitrary property as the unmarked one? ±FEMALE and ±DEAD are
just as valid as primitive features, as the reverse. Furthermore, restriction to binary values
excludes the inclusion of relational concepts that are necessary for any analysis of meaning
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in general. Overall, then, while componential analysis does provide a means of predicting
sense relations, it does so at the expense of a considerable amount of arbitrariness
3.2 Lexical decomposition
Although the structuralist concept of lexical fields is one that did not develop in the way
that its proponents might have expected, nevertheless it reinforced the view that words
are semantically related and that this relatedness can be identified and used to structure a
vocabulary. It is this concept of a structured lexicon that persists in mainstream linguistics.
In the same way, lexical decompositional analyses have developed in rather different ways
than were envisaged at the time that componential semantic analysis was developed. (See
also 17. Lexical decomposition.)
Decomposition of lexical meaning appears in Montague (1974), one of the earliest at-
tempts to provide a formal analysis of a fragment of a natural language as one of two
different mechanisms for specifying the interpretations of words. Certain expressions with
a logical interpretation, like be and necessarily, are decomposed, not into cognitive primi-
tives, but into complex logical expressions, reflecting their truth-conditional content. For
example, necessarily receives the logical translation λp[p], where the abstracted variable,
p, ranges over propositions and the decomposition has the effect of equating the semantics
of the adverb with that of the logical necessity operator, . Montague restricted decompo-
sition of this sort to those grammatical expressions whose truth conditional meaning can
be given a purely logical characterisation. In a detailed analysis of word meaning within
Montague Semantics, however, Dowty (1979) argued that certain entailments associated
with content expressions are constant in the same way as those associated with grammat-
ical expressions and he extended the decompositional approach to analyse such words in
order to capture such apparently independent entailments.
Dowtys exposition is concerned primarily with inferences from verbs (and more complex
predicates) that involve tense and modality. By adopting three operators DO, BECOME
and CAUSE, he is able to decompose the meanings of a range of different types of verbs,
including activities, accomplishments, inchoatives and causatives, to account for the en-
tailments that can be drawn from sentences containing them. For example, he provides
decomposition rules for de-adjectival inchoative and causative verbs in English that modify
the predicative interpretation of base adjectives in English. Dowty uses the propositional
operator BECOME for inchoative interpretations of (e.g.) cool: λx[BECOME cool′(x)]
where cool is the semantic representation of the meaning of the predicative adjective and
the semantics of BECOME ensures that the resulting predicate is true of some individual
just in case it is now cool but just previously was not cool. The causative interpretation of
the verb involves the CAUSE operator in addition: λyλx[x CAUSE BECOME cool′(y)]
which guarantees the entailment between (e.g.) Mary cooled the wine and Mary caused the
wine to become cool. Dowty also gives more complex (and less obviously logical) decom-
positions for other content expressions, such as kill which may be interpreted as x causes
y to become not alive.
The quasi-logical decompositions suggested by Dowty have been taken up in theories
such as Role and Reference Grammar (van Valin & LaPolla 1997) but primarily for account-
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ing for syntagmatic relations such as argument realisation, rather than for accounting for
paradigmatic sense relations. The same is not quite true for other decompositional theories
of semantics such as that put forward in the Generative Lexicon Theory of Pustejovsky
(1995). Pustejovsky presents a theory designed specifically to account for structured pol-
ysemous relations such as those given in (11-13) utilising a complex internal structure
for word meanings that goes a long way further than that put forward by Katz & Fodor
(1963). In particular, words are associated with a number of different ‘structures’ that
may be more or less complex. These include: argument structure which gives the number
and semantic type of logical arguments; event structure specifying the type of event of
the lexeme; and lexical inheritance structure, essentially hyponymous relations (which can
be of a more general type showing the hierarchical structure of the lexicon). The most
powerful and controversial structure proposed is the qualia structure. Qualia is a Latin
term meaning ‘of whatever sort’ and is used for the Greek aitiai ‘blame’, ‘responsibility’
or ‘cause’ to link the current theory with Aristotles modes of explanation. Essentially the
qualia structure gives semantic properties of a number of different sorts concerning the
basic sense properties, prototypicality properties and encyclopaedic information of certain
sorts. This provides an explicit model for how meaning shifts and polyvalency phenomena
interact. The qualia structure provides the structural template over which semantic com-
binatorial devices, such as co-composition, type coercion and subselection, may apply to
alter the meaning of a lexical item. Pustejovsky (1991, 417) defines qualia structure as:
• The relation between [a word’s denotation] and its constituent parts
• That which distinguishes it within a larger domain (its physical characteristics)
• Its purpose and function
• Whatever brings it about
Such information is used in interpreting sentences such as those in (20)
(20) a. Bill uses the train to get to work.
b. This car uses diesel fuel.
The verb use is semantically underspecified and the factors that allow us to determine
which sense is appropriate for any instance of the verb are the qualia structures for each
phrase in the construction and a rich mode of composition, which is able to take advantage
of this information. For example, in (20a) it is the function of trains to take people to
places, so use here may be interpreted as ‘catches’, ‘takes’ or ‘rides on’. Analogously, cars
contain engines and engines require fuel to work, so the verb in (20b) can be interpreted as
‘runs on’, ‘requires’, etc. Using these mechanisms Pustejovsky provides analyses of complex
lexical phenomena, including coercion, polysemy and both paradigmatic and syntagmatic
sense relations.
Without going into detail, Pustejovskys fundamental hypothesis is that the lexicon
is generative and compositional, with complex meanings deriving from less complex ones
in structured ways, so that the lexical representations of words should express only as
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much information as they need to express a basic concept that allows as wide a range
of combinatorial properties as possible. Additionally, lexical information is hierarchically
structured with rules specifying how phrasal representations can be built up from lexical
ones as words are combined. A view which contrasts strongly with that discussed in the
next section. (See also 17. Lexical decomposition.)
3.3 Meaning postulates and semantic atomism
In addition to decomposition for logico-grammatical word meaning, Montague (1974) also
adopted a second approach to accounting for the meaning of basic expressions, Meaning
Postulates were introduced in Carnap (1956) and consist of universally quantified condi-
tional or bi-conditional statements in the logical metalanguage which constrain the deno-
tations of the constant that appears in the antecedent. For example, Montague provides
an example that relates the denotations of the verb seek and the phrase try to find. (21)
states (simplified from Montague) that for every instance of x seeking y there is an instance
of x trying find y:
(21) ∀x∀y[seek′(x, y)↔ try-to(x,∧ find′(x, y)]
Note that the semantics of seek, on this approach, does not contain the content of try
to find, as in the decompositional approach. The necessity operator, , ensures that the
relation holds in all admissible models, i.e. in all states-of-affairs that we can talk about
using the object language. This raises the bi-conditional statement to the status of a
logical truth (an axiom) which ensures that on every occasion in which it is true to say of
someone that she is seeking something then it is also true to say that she is trying to find
that something (and vice versa). Meaning postulates provide a powerful tool for encoding
detailed information about non-logical entailments associated with particular lexemes (or
their translation counterparts).
A theory that utilises meaning postulates treats the meaning of words as atomic with
their semantic relations specified directly. So, although traditional sense relations, both
paradigmatic and syntagmatic, can easily be reconstructed in the system (see Cann 1993
for an attempt at this) they do not follow from the semantics of the words themselves. For
advocates of this theory, this is taken as an advantage. In the first place, it allows for condi-
tional, as opposed to bi-conditional, relations, as necessary in a decompositional approach.
So while we might want to say that an act of killing involves an act of causing something to
die, the reverse may not hold. If kill is decomposed as x CAUSE(BECOME(¬alive′(y))),
then this fact cannot be captured. A second advantage of atomicity is that even if a word’s
meaning can be decomposed to a large extent, there is nevertheless often a ‘residue of
meaning’ which cannot be decomposed into other elements. This is exactly what the fea-
ture CANINE is in the simple componential analysis given above: it is the core meaning of
dog/bitch that cannot be further decomposed. In decomposition, therefore, one needs both
some form of atomic concept and the decomposed elements whereas in atomic approaches
word meanings are individual concepts (or denotations), not further decomposed. What
relations they have with the meanings of other words is a matter of the world (or of expe-
rience of the world) not of the meanings of the words themselves. Fodor & Lepore (1998)
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argue extensively against decompositionality, in particular Pustejovsky, in a way similar
to the criticism made against field theories above. They argue that while it might be that
a dog (necessarily) denotes an animal, knowing that dogs are animals is not necessary for
knowing what dog means. Given the non-necessity of knowing these inferences for knowing
the meaning of the word means that they (including interlexical relations) should not be
imposed on lexical entries, because these relations are not part of the linguistic meaning.
Criticisms can be made of atomicity and the use of meaning postulates (see Pustejovsky
1998 for a rebuttal of Fodor & Lepore’s views). In particular, since meaning postulates
are capable of defining any type of semantic relation, traditional sense relations form just
arbitrary and unpredictable parts of the postulate system, impossible to generalise over.
Nevertheless it is possible to define theories in which words have atomic meanings, but
the paradigmatic sense relations are used to organise the lexicon. Such a one is WordNet
developed by George A. Miller (1995) to provide a lexical database of English organised by
grouping words together that are cognitive synonyms (a synset), each of which expresses
a distinct concept with different concepts associated with a word being found in different
synsets (much like a thesaurus). These synsets then are related to each other by lexical
and conceptual properties, including the basic paradigmatic sense relations. Although it
remains true that the sense relations are stated independently of the semantics of the words
themselves, nonetheless it is possible to claim that using them as an organisational principle
of the lexicon provides them with a primitive status with respect to human cognitive
abilities. WordNet was set up to reflect the apparent way that humans process expressions
in a language and so using the sense relations as an organisational principle is tantamount
to claiming that they are the basis for the organisation of the human lexicon, even if
the grouping of specific words into synsets and the relations defined between them is not
determined directly by the meanings of the words themselves. (See also 125. Semantics in
computational lexicons.)
A more damning criticism of the atomic approach is that context-dependent polysemy
is impossible because each meaning (whether treated as a concept or a denotation) is in
principle independent of every other meaning. A consequence of this, as Pustejovsky points
out, is that every polysemous interpretation of a word has to be listed separately and the
interpretation of a word in context is a matter of selecting the right concept/denotation
a priori. It cannot be computed from aspects of the meaning of a word with those of
other words with which it appears. For example, the meanings of gradable adjectives such
as good in (16) will need different concepts associated with each collocation that are in
principle independent of each other. Given that new collocations between words are made
all the time and under the assumption that the number of slightly new senses that result
are potentially infinite in number, this is a problem for storage given the finite resources of
the human brain. A further consequence is that, without some means of computing new
senses, the independent concepts cannot be learned and so must be innate. While Fodor
(1998) has suggested the possibility of the consequence being true, this is an extremely
controversial and unpopular hypothesis that is not likely to help our understanding of the
nature of word meaning.
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4. Conclusion
In the above discussion, I have not been able to more than scratch the surface of the
debates over the sense relations and their place in theories of word meaning. I have not
discussed the important contributions of decompositionalists such as Jackendoff, or the
problem of analyticity (Quine 1960), or the current debate between contextualists and
semantic minimalists (Cappelen & Lepore 2005, Wedgwood 2007). Neither have I gone
into any detail about the variations and extensions of sense relations themselves, such
as is often found in Cognitive Linguistics (e.g. Croft and Cruse 2004). And much more
besides. Are there any conclusions that we can currently draw? Clearly, sense relations
are good descriptive devices helping with the compilation of dictionaries and thesauri, as
well as the development of large scale databases of words for use in various applications
beyond the confines of linguistics, psychology and philosophy. It would, however, appear
that the relation between sense relations and word meaning itself remains problematic.
Given the overriding context dependence of the latter, it is possible that pragmatics will
provide explanations of observed phenomena better than explicitly semantic approaches
(see for example, Blu¨tner 2002, Murphy 2003, Wilson & Carston 2006). Furthermore,
the evidence from psycholinguistic and developmental studies, as well as the collocational
sensitivity of sense, indicates that syntagmatic relations may be cognitively primary and
that paradigmatic relations may be learned, either explicitly or through experience as part
of the development of inferential capability, rather than as being a central part of the
semantics of words themselves.
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